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ENGLISH ADMINISTRATION OF THE ORIMINAL LAW.'
From circumstances of which some are temporary and accidental,
but others, it may be feared, belong to the system of our jurisprudence, a more than ordinary anxiety prevails at the present time
respecting our criminal law and its administration. This feeling
has given rise to considerable alarm; and the usual effect of such a
state of mind in the community hafbeen, great exaggeration of the
facts really existing, and a more than ordinary amount of fiction
and thoughtlessness ; of things supposed that had no reality; of
consequences deduced from the object of apprehension, which had
no manner of connection with it. Thus, all offences were imagined
to be committed by convicts liberated before the term of their punishment had arrived; and, though it is impossible to deny that
some were suffered to go free without due precaution before their
discharge, or without needful supervision after it, the very same
evils were plainly to be apprehended from the liberation of the
great majority of culprits whose entire time of confinement had
elapsed.
That sone course must be taken by th- lg'slature for improving
our system of secondary punishments, either by partial recurrence
Flrom the London Law Magazine for February, 1857, p. 353.
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to transportation, by well-devised plans of forced labor, or by more
adequate terms of imprisonment, or by all these means combined,
appears now nearly certain. But those who are the most convinced
of that necessity, whatever difference of opinion may divide them as
to the measures required, must agree in this, that the existing law
ought to be administered with even more than ordinary care; that
pains should be taken to prevent the introduction of erroneous
maxims in the proceedings of criminal courts; and that the high
and most delicate office of the executive power in respect of sentences pronounced by the judicial authorities, should be watched
-with an anxiety proportioned to the danger which must attend
erroneous views in this important matter. When those who, like
-ourselves, have the duty cast upon them of examining the judicial
and administrative processes of the day, see reason to question. the
soundness of either the views upon which courts act, or those which
guide the government, it is their bounden duty to state their opinion firmly, though respectfully, and to bring the subject under the
notice of the legal' profession, indeed of the community at large.
Some things have lately occurred which seem to call for such discussion, either.because dangerous oversights have been committed
by judges and juries, or because the power of remitting punishihents, sometimes of changint'them, should seem to have'been
exercised upon mistaken principles. We assume that all must 'be
agreed in favor of a stern, unbending execution of the law for repressing*the offences attended with violence, now so generally complained of, and that the false humanity, always to be put aside in
dispensing the criminal law, is more peculiarly out of place when
this class of delinquency has assumed more than ordinary proportions. If the published accounts of such trials are wholly erroneous
(and'we have taken great pains to consult and compare them,) then
it is another instance of false humanity, if courts do not protect
their proceedings from such misrepresentation, not-only because the
character and authority of. the judges are thus impaired, but because a dangerous inference is suffered to mislead the community,
and to encourage offenders by concealing the hazards to which their
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crimes expose them. The first observation to which the attention
of the reader is directed, arises upon a late trial for an aggravated
assault.
The prisoner, a young gentleman, apparently of dissipated habits,
was proved to have inflicted a severe wound upon a young woman,
probably of the town ; and the question, indeed the only possible
question in the case, was whether he had or not given the blow with
intent to do grievous bodily harm. That an aggravated assault
had been committed there was no doubt pretended to be raised ; the
question was, whether a felonious act had not been committed. The
crime was this: lie hauL come out of a cassino, and showing a large
clasp-knife, with a blade five inches long and exceedingly sharp, to
a policeman, lie said in a wild and vaporing manner, "If the landlord comes out I will stab him to the heart." The policeman took
the knife from him and shut it, saying he must be in jest, and advising him to go home ; but he said he should stab every one he
inct, and, before the man could seize the knife again, the prisoner
accosted the girl with foul language, and on her saying she knew
him not, he asked how she would like that, showing the knife, with
which he instantly made a thrust at her, and inflicted a wound in
her groin three-quarters of an inch long, cutting through her dress,
and causing her to bleed profusely. At the trial, ten days after-wards, the girl was still suffering very much, and was carried out of
court. She swore that she never had seen the prisoner before, and
that nothing else had passed than the threat and the attack. The
surgeon proved that the wound was dangerous.; and the policeman
said that the prisoner seemed thunderstruck at what he had done,
when he saw tle poor girl bleeding, and called himself a drunkard
and a blackguard. There was not the least attempt even to prove
him drunk; the only reliance for his defence lay upon his friends,
and three officers, with whom he had served in a militia regiment,
describing him as a quiet, inoffensive young man. The learned
judge apparently did not, the jury certainly did not, consider the
charge proved vi 'ntcnt to do grievous bodily harm; and he was
sentenced, as for "-n aggravated assault only, to a year's imprisonment, with Lard hbor. lie was proved by his friends to be only
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eighteen years of age; but he had joined the regiment above a year
before. The knife was proved to be.of a dangerous nature from its
size and sharpness, and it closed Xith a clasp. We take leave to
consider the facts, if there be no question of sanity, and none was
even hinted at, quite sufficient to prove, according to every principle of law, the intent to do grievous bodily harm; and we regard
it as productive of the very worst possible consequences to shake
the known rule, that every one must be held to intend that to effect
which his actions have a natural-it was here an inevitable-tendency; but say only a natural and probable tendency, and the thing
done converts this probability into certainty.
It was impossible the jury should have acquitted the prisoner of
wounding with felonious intent, unless upon one or other of four
suppositions, assuming his sanity not to be in dispute: first, that
he only brandished the knife, and that the girl ran upon it; secondly, that he hit her but in play; thirdly, that he intended only
to give a slight cut or scratch; fourthly, that he was drunk, and
had not any precise intention. The first supposition is negatived
by the whole evidence; that of the policeman as well as of the girl
herself, both concerning the prisoner's words, his previous demeanor, and the act itself. Indeed, upon this supposition, there
ought to have been an absolute acquittal ; for it negatives not only
the felonious intent, but all criminal intent, and reduces the act
either to that of the prosecutrix herself, or to chance medley. The
second supposition is wholly inadmissible as a ground of negativing
the intent; because jie was bound to know that such an instrument,
if used to give any blow, might do grievous harm, as much so if
used in play as if used with a serious design; and it is wholly impossible to draw a line, so that a certain degree of harm may be
done in play, and anything beyond it is deliberate. The third
supposition is as inadmissible as the second; for this plain reason,
that the wrongdoer runs the risk of his act exceeding his intention,
as much as of its exceeding his calculation; and nothing could possibly be more mischievous, than introducing the least subtlety or
refinement into the question of men's intentions. If a man fires
a pistol into a crowd, and death ensues, he is guilty, not of man-
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slaughter, but of murder ; and cannot be heard to aver either that
he had no intent to kill, or that he did not believe he should hit any
one. So if one, meaning to wound but no more, gives a blow that
produces death, it is murder, though his intent of only wounding be
admitted; and though his calculation, that the wound would not be
mortal, be allowed to have had some foundation. It is possible that
the learned judge may not have pressed this upon the jury with
sufficient force, or with due precision. Certainly, if the reports
which appear of the trial be correct, he concluded the "evidence of
intent to have been slight ;" but the act itself furnished sufficient
evidence if its nature was such that bodily harm most probably
would ensue from it, because the party doing that act must have
been taken to know its consequences. Possibly the judge's attention had not been sufficiently called to the manner in which the
knife, exceedingly sharp and five inclles long, penetrated through
the girl's dress or thick petticoat. But we come to thefourtlh supposition, which requires a few observations.
There was no evidence given of intoxication ; but it is possible
that the jury may have taken into their consideration the extravagance of the prisoner's conduct, and his exclaiming that he was a
drunkard. The learned judge most fully stated that drunkenness
was no defence ; but he appears not to have sufficiently explained
to them that it was to be laid out of view in considering the question of intent. We assume that lie held the sound opinion, as we
very clearly hold it to be, that intoxication is no more to be regarded on the point of motive or intent, than it is on the general
question of guilt. But we are aware that in some late cases a doubt
has been thrown upon this subject; and we hold it as exceedingly
unfortunate that any such doctrine, if it can be so termed, should
have been countenanced, or even suggested. If a person commits an offence while under the influence of such beastly intoxication that he was wholly ignorant of what he did, there cannot be
a doubt that lie is treated exactly as if he had been perfectly sober.
Why is it so -. -%)r this reason-that the condition in which he was
had been c ta:i, by his own voluntary act, and therefore could be
nd defence. rnaj, could not be taken into consideration at all, and
I
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that he was answerable for all he did in that state. But this is not
the whole ground of the rule. The consequences of allowing such
a defence are most material'points, the foundation of the rule; for,
if drunkenness were admitted to excuse crimes, all criminals must
escape punishment by adding intemperance to their offence. Then
surely the very same reasons, both. the one and the other, apply to
the proposition, that in judging of a party's intent the condition
into which he had voluntarily thrown himself must be dismissed from
our view. In truth, the question of guilty or not guilty is transferred to the question of intent, and no reason can be assigned for
allowing intoxication to cast doubt upon the intent, that might not
be equally given for allowing intoxication to work a general acquittal.
One of the cases referred to in considering this. subject was of a
peculiar kind, and is wholly inapplicable to the general question.
In Queen vs. Moor, 3 Car. & Kir. 319, the chief justice (Jervis)
considered that the prisoner, who was tried for an attempt to commit suicide, being found to have been so drunk as not to know what
she was about, it could not be said that she contemplated self-destruction, and there was an acquittal. Stribtly speaking, there may
be more than a doubt if this direction to the jury was right; but, at
any rate, the thing done was no offence at all; the whole crime consisted in the intention ; and there is not the saine certainty given
to'.that intent by the act itself, as where a crime has been committed. If death had ensued, it seems clear that the state of deceased, when she was found to have meditated self-destruction,
could not have been held to overrule that proof, when the question
arose before the coroner. The great mischief of any rule being
laid down which tends in the least to weaken the guards against intemperance as the cause of offences, need hardly be dwelt upon.
The increase of outrages committed under the influence of intoxication, has been very remarkable of late years; for there can be no
doubt that the outrages, so much and so justly complained of as
more frequent than formerly, have in most instances been committed
by drunken persons. It becomes, therefore, the bounden duty of
all 'magistrates to avoid even an approach to the infringement of
the rule which peremptorily excludes such a defence in all cases;

,

ENGLISH ADIINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW.

and we must regard the very anomalous dicta to which we have
been referring as somewhat like an infraction of the rule. Even in
the case cited, if the woman, having had a quarrel with her husband, and been turned out of the house to prevent her from attacking him, had, instead of attempting to drown herself, rushed upon
him and inflicted a mortal wound: her drunkenness never could have
been even given in evidence upon the trial for murder, and could
only have been urged as some ground for a mitigation by the crown
of the capital sentence -which must have been pronounced by the
court. It is difficult, then, to understand how the same state of
intoxication could be ta';en into the account on the question, what
were her intentions on throwing herself into the well, which could
not even be listened to on the other question of intention, whether
she killed her husband of malice aforethought.
The age of the prisoner in the stabbing case was very properly
in all likelihood, not allowed to have any weight either with the
jury, or in awarding the punishment on conviction. A person who
had for a year been in the command of soldiers, could expect no
benefit from such a topic. Indeed, it was probably recollected, both
by the court and the jury, that about the same time a.foreign seaman, of the same age, had been capitally convicted of murder, and
that all attempts'had failed to obtain a commutation of the sentence,
the grounds of the application having probably been, not so much
the lad's age, as his having been drawn or frightened by his elder
associates into a participation of their guilt. The sentence of a
year's imprisonment with hard labor in the case on which we have
been commenting, has perhaps met with no disapprobation in any
quarter on account of its severity. The prisoner's family gave,
very properly, the sum of fifty pounds to the poor girl who had
been so cruelly treated.
The subject of remission or commutation of punishment, to which
we have just alluded, is one that -urgently requires to be at least
fully considered. Nothing can be more unsatisfactory than the
manner in which this high prerogative of the crown is exercised.
We do not in the least mean to complain of the excellent and able
., rsoi.s i ii., perform the duties of the Home Department; but we
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believe the opinion .has become very generally prevalent, that the
arrangements of the system are extremely faulty, both because the
work of inquiry into the merits of each case is to be done without
adequate assistance, and because the discretion vested in the office
is exercised without any control or supervision.
It is necessary, first of all, to consider the great number of cases
which mustcontinually be brought before the Home Office, and must
be disposed of either by the chief or some subordinate, probably the
Under-Secretary of State. All the applications of convicts by their
friends; the not rare interposition of humane persons, or persons
who have strong feelings, and indeed opinions regarding punishments; the cases on which the judge had doubts, and suggested further inquiry, as well as those which he deemed fit for a merciful
dispensation ; the cases which others, and the officers of the depart•ment themselves, may think deserving of notice upon seeing reports of
the trial,-all this investigation, anxious as it must be, laborious as
it ought to be, is required of those whose other duties, both admin.'istrative and parliamentary, are sufficient to occupy their attention
and indeed to employ their time. It is only by accident that the
chief is a lawyer, and then he must rely upon an irresponsible subordinate. In all cases, no doubt the judge is consulted; but it often
-must be a question how far hils opinions should be deemed conclusive. Then let it next be considered how many punishments are
arbitrary, that is, in the discretion of the judge. In all cases of
misdemeanor, and, as the law now stands, in almost all cases of
felony, it depends upon the judge to what amount of punishment,
most commonly indeed to what kind of punishment, the person convicted shall be sentenced. But there are fifteen judges, quite four
times as many chairmen of Quarter Sessions, and about an equal
number of Recorders; let us, however, only say the fifteen judges of
the supreme courts. These may act on very various views of what
is just and fit in apportioning the punishment to the offence. When
the committee in the House of Lords, some years ago, examined the
judges of the Court of Banlkruptcy upon the important 'question of
class certificates, it appears by the printed evidence ' that these
I Report, 18.53.
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learned and experienced persons differed materially in the principles
upon which they made their adjudication. It is certain that, if the
criminal judges were examined in the same way, they might decline
answering general questions as to the views which governed them,
and would most probably say, "1Each case must depend on its own
circumstances ;" yet if their opinions were sifted by the suggestion
of particular instances, and one after another were asked how he
would punish such an offence, proved to have been committed in
such circumstances, there -would be found no little discrepancy in
their answers-those answers being concealed from each on all being
examined successively. Therefore, it is manifest that a considerable
latitude must, of necessity, be left to the Home Office, in deciding
upon the matters brought before it, even in cases where the help of
the judge is obtained. We may observe in passing, that a very
powerful argument is raised, by the matter which we have just been
stating, in favor of a Minister of Justice, whose watchful superintendence of all proceedings before the judges may be required to
preserve uniformity of decision, not indeed by overruling the opinion
of the judges, but by friendly and confidential discussion with them.
It must now be further stated, that beside the excessive labor,
rendering a full examination of each case impossible, the system
leaves too much to the discretion of the office. All authority exercised without control is liable to be abused; and we of course speak
of no corrupt or unworthy influences as at all likely to interfere ;
but there is abuse if prejudice, preconceived opinions as to punishment, judgment too stern or too compassionate, or an alternation of
severity and tenderness, Inay, what may be termed caprice, shall be
found'to influence the decisions 6f the office. Nor is the possibility
of this occurring lessened when we find it laid down as a rule in
Parliament, that no explanations shall be .given of the grounds
upon which mercy has been extended to one case, and withheld
from another. It is said that this would be an interference with the
high and delicate office of administering mercy. Some years ago a
person in the city was convicted of murder; he having rushed upon
an eminent merchant and shot him dead with a pistol. It appeared
soon after that he had been suffered to go free, and he went abroad;
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no explanation was given. Very lately a woman was convicted of
an atrocious murder: she had, with the greatest deliberation, killed
her child, eleven years of age. -The capital punishment was remitted. To the Italian lad's case we have already referred ; there
the sentence was executed. Now it is very likely that but for the
rule against giving any explanation as to the grounds whereon the
prerogative of mercy is exercised, reasons might have been assigned
for the determination of the department in all these cases. Nevertheless, we cannot avoid a~gplying Lord Coke's maxim to the administration of the law, as well as to the law itself. Plus laudatur
quando ratione probatur.
There may be considerable difficulty in devising such an arrangement as may afford to the department the needful information, and
subject it to the desired control. Nor, when we speak of control
are we to be understood as meaning anything like an absolute veto
upon the determination of the officer of State; but, in the greater
number of cases, he would certainly adopt the suggestions of an
able, learned, and experienced board, which ought to be composed
for example, of a chief judge and two puisnes, taking the work in
rotation. If, indeed, the legislature shall at length accede to the
general desire among all friends of legal amendment, and of the
most respectable men out of the profession, no less than of the legal
authorities, and shall establish a Minister of Justice, he would of
course preside over the department; and to him, as a minister of
the crown, would naturally be transferred the power now vested in
the Secretary of State. But, of course, neither would he be bound
by the opinion of the other members of the board, nor would the
crown be bound by his decision, any more than it now is by that of
the Home Department.
This leads us to remark, that in what we are now suggesting,
there is no interfering with the prerogative. The eminent and
transcendant office of dispensing justice in mercy would still be
vested, absolutely and entirely vested, in the sovereign, to be exercised, of course, like all the prerogatives, by the advice and through
the hands of responsible advisers,-so of the crown's right in appeals; it has always been exercised through the Privy Council,

